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STUDENT COMMENTS
ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS ACTIONS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS—PEERING THROUGH
THE ZAHN SMOG
INTRODUCTION: Zahn v. International Paper'
The class action is a procedural device allowing a large number
of people who have suffered small individual wrongs to seek redress
collectively. 2 Controversies involving the environment typically in-
volve numerous plaintiffs, difficult questions of fact, and extensive
use of expert testimony on complex scientific issues. The damage
claims of each injured person are often either of indeterminate
amount or of such a small amount as to make the cost of asserting
them impractical relative to the possible benefit. Environmental
suits, then, are particularly amenable to the class action form of
uit. •
Either because of the confusion generated by the "true," "hy-
brid," and "spurious" classifications3 spawned by the original Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 or simply because of the
absence of environmental consciousness, class actions were not used
to any appreciable extent to enforce environmental rights prior to
1966, the year the new Rule 23 5 was promulgated. The new Rule
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), aff'g 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.
1972).
2 See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 684 (1941).
3
 For a discussion of the difficulties experienced with the classifications established by
the original version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, see Advisory Comm. Note to Amendments to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Comm. Note].
4
 When promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1938, Rule 23 provided, in pertinent part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued,
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do
or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought .
	 . .
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645, 689 (1938).
3 The Supreme Court deleted the former Rule 23 and replaced it with Fed. R. Civ. P.
23, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
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attempted to eliminate the classification of class action suits accord-
ing to the rights sought to be enforced and instead adopted a
functional approach, focusing on whether a class action was pro-
cedurally appropriate under the given circumstances. 6 Since en-
vironmental complaints particularly lend themselves to class relief,
it appeared that the new Rule 23 would open the way to this form of
litigation in the environmental area.
It seemed that these hopes were dashed when, in 1973, the
Supreme Court affirmed a Second Circuit decision in Zahn v. Inter-
national Paper Co. 7 and held that "[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff
who does not must be dismissed from the case—one plaintiff may
not ride in on another's coattails." 8 The jurisdictional amount re-
ferred to is that required by section 1332 of Title 28, 9 currently
$10,000, which is the amount of damages that must be claimed by
the plaintiff in a diversity action in order to gain access to the
federal forum for purposes of enforcing state-created rights."' The
(b) Class actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (13) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
6
 Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to the Class Action—A Symposium, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 497 (1969).
7
 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
g 414 U.S. at 301, quoting 469 F.2d at 1035.
9
 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) which provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between—(1) citizens of different States . . . ."
1 ° Although the Zahn decision is, of course, restricted to diversity actions, the Court
strongly implied that the holding would also apply to cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
the "federal question" domain. 414 U.S. at 302 n.11, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) provides: "(a)
The [federal] district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
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majority opinion in Zahn, written by Justice White, has been
strongly criticized," with some justification. However, it will be
shown that there are approaches to environmental problems, even
under Rule 23(b)(3), 12 that are unaffected by the Zahn decision.
Across the spectrum of all environmental class actions there is a
continuum of claims presented by plaintiffs: on one end are actions
seeking only monetary damages, on the other end are those seeking
only injunctive relief; in between lie actions wherein plaintiffs seek
both monetary damages and injunctive relief. The relative desire for
each form of relief varies according to the amount of harm already
suffered and the ability of plaintiffs to cope with the pollutant in the
future. Those plaintiffs with substantial monetary damage claims
can, of course, resort to traditional common law theories and sue as
individuals.' 3 Whether such plaintiffs seek only damages or pray for
injunctive relief as well, a class action has relatively few advantages
from their point of view since the prospect of large damages awards
is often a sufficient economic inducement to risk the costs of indi-
vidual litigation; thus the Zahn decision leaves these plaintiffs unaf-
fected. But if individual damages are not substantial, plaintiffs will
find it economically impractical to sue as individuals. Divers plain-
tiffs in an attempted class action seeking only monetary relief under
Rule 23(b)(3) or 23(b)(1)(B) actions' 4 often suffer widely variant
amounts of damage, making it difficult for the class to establish the
common and undivided interest, necessary after Zahn, 15 to allow
aggregation to meet the jurisdictional amount. For plaintiffs in this
situation, Zahn may have a fatal effect on their claims. If they
cannot aggregate their damages to meet the jurisdictional amount,
they will be unable to use the class action device. In addition, the
individual route to environmental enforcement, because it lacks a
sufficient economic inducement, will often remain unpursued.
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." There are, however,
significant reasons why the argument for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a Zahn - type
fact situation, discussed in text at notes 34-36 infra, is even more compelling in a federal
question context than in a diversity context. In diversity actions the issue typically is one of
state law, which federal courts are not anxious to interpret. On the other hand, federal
question actions involve issues of federal law which are better resolved in federal court where
there is more expertise in handling federal statutes. Thus the Supreme Court has been less
quick to preclude federal jurisdiction whenever a federal question is presented along with a
state claim. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), where plaintiff
asserted a claim under the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970), and a
related claim under state law. The Court concluded that the trial court, having assumed
jurisdiction over the federal claim, had power to adjudicate the state claim under the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction, a sub-category of ancillary jurisdiction. 383 U.S. at 725. See text at
notes 97-103 infra.
" See, e,g., Note, 10 Idaho L. Rev. 287 (1974); Note, 35 Ohio St. L.J. 190 (1974),
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
13 See, e.g., cases collected at H. Tiffany, The Modern Law of Real Property § 519 nn,
7-16, at 520-21 (C. Zoliman ed. 1940).
14
 For the full text of Rule 23, see note 5, supra.
15 414 U.S. at 299.
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More common than cases where plaintiffs enforcing environ-
mental rights seek only monetary damages are those situations in
which plaintiffs seek both monetary damages and a cessation of the
defendant's conduct by court injunction under Rule 23(b)(1), (2) or
(3) class actions. Here, the effect of Zahn will depend on the facts
involved in each case and the relative desire for each remedy. Those
plaintiffs interested in recovering damages and only incidentally
interested in obtaining injunctive relief face the greatest difficulty in
trying to clear the hurdle of Zahn. Each plaintiff's primary interest
is his individual damage claim, with only a secondary interest
common to all plaintiffs in obtaining injunctive relief. Whether the
putative class can establish the Zahn-required common and undi-
vided interest and thus be allowed to aggregate its claims is likely to
depend on how individualized the damage claims are and how
appropriate injunctive . relief is, i.e., how well the claim for injunc-
tive relief fits into one of the Rule 23(b) subcategories."' An abstract
way of appraising the latter factor is that the further along a class
moves on the continuum of interests to the predominately injunctive
relief side of the spectrum, the greater its chance of successfully
establishing the common and undivided interest necessary to allow
aggregation for the class action. Where there are many plaintiffs
who seek only injunctive relief, it appears that the Zahn holding
becomes inapplicable since the only interest at issue is the common
one of halting the challenged conduct."
This comment will explore the Rule 23(b)(3)" possibilities for
environmental class actions left after Zahn, as well as the alterna-
tive avenues of Rule 23(b)(1) 19 and (b)(2)2° class actions. It will then
focus on the use of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 21 and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 22 as
substitutes for the class action suit as means of resolving certain
categories of environmental disputes.
16 See notes 18-20 infra.
17
 In an action seeking only injunctive relief the amount in controversy is the value of the
right to be protected or the extent of the injury to be prevented. C. Wright, Handbook of the
Law of Federal Courts § 33, at 116 (2d ed. 1970). See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. City of
Girard, 210 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir. 1954). The important point to be drawn from this is that
where there is a common and undivided interest, plaintiffs would be allowed to aggregate
their claims; and the aggregate value of many plaintiffs' rights to a clean environment should
often be greater than $10,000. Cf. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972).
18
 Rule 23(b)(3) provides for a class action where questions of law or fact predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members. For the full text of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3), see note 5 supra.
19 Rule 23(b)(1) provides for a class action where the prosecution of individual actions
would force the defendant into inconsistent acts, or would be dispositive of the interests of
others not party to the adjudications. For the full text of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), see note 5
supra.
20
 Rule 23(b)(2) provides for a class action where injunctive relief with respect to the
class as a whole is appropriate. For the full text of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(bX2), see note 5 supra.
1 ' 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (Supp. II 1972).
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-3 to 1858a (1970).
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I. THE Zahn HOLDING
In Zahn, four named plaintiffs alleged that pieces of a sludge
mass created by the defendant's paper plant periodically broke off
and washed up on plaintiffs property, making it unfit for reasonable
use and permanently diminishing its value. 23 On behalf of them-
selves and some 200 similarly situated owners and lessees of lake-
front property on Lake Champlain, plaintiffs brought a class action
under Rule 23(b)(3), seeking compensatory and punative damages
totalling $40,000,000. 24 Plaintiffs invoked federal jurisdiction,
claiming the requisite diversity of citizenship and amount in con-
troversy. 25 The United States District Court for the District of
Vermont found that the claims of each of the four named plaintiffs
satisfied the $10,000 jurisdictional amount, but it was convinced to
a legal certainty that not every individual owner in the proposed
class had suffered pollution damages greater than $10,000. 26 Read-
ing the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Snyder v. Harris" as
precluding participation in the action by any member whose claim
was less than $10,000 and concluding that a joinder of owners with
claims greater than $10,000 would be as advantageous as a class
action, the district court refused to permit the suit to go forward as a
class action. 28 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld the decision of the trial court in a divided opinion, 29
relying principally on the authority of Snyder. 3 ° The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that "[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action
must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does
not must be dismissed from the case. . ."31
The Supreme Court relied heavily on Snyder, 32 which held that
plaintiffs who have separate and distinct claims in a Rule 23 action
cannot aggregate the amount of their individual claims to meet the
$10,000 jurisdictional requirement. 33 Zahn was clearly distinguish-
able from Snyder in that four of the Zahn plaintiffs met the jurisdic-
tional amount, whereas none did in Snyder. The Zahn Court's
reliance on Snyder was therefore unnecessary: having jurisdiction
over the claims of the four named plaintiffs who met the requisite
amount in controversy, the Court could have allowed the district
court to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the claims of the plain-
23 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Cir. 1972).
24 Id.
25
 As required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). See note 9 supra.
26
 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971).
27 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
28
 53 F.R.D. at 434.
29 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
30 Id. at 1034-36.




 394 U.S. at 336. For an excellent critique of Snyder and the court of appeals decision
in Zahn, see Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 543 (1973).
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tiffs who did not. 34
 Although at least one lower federal court had
exercised ancillary jurisdiction to bring into a class action otherwise
non-qualifying plaintiffs, 35
 the Supreme Court failed to apply the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to obtain jurisdiction over indi-
vidual plaintiffs who did not meet the jurisdictional amount in a
Rule 23(b)(3) action. 36
 Instead, the Court relied solely on the Snyder
non-aggregation theory .
 to achieve a result apparently contrary to
the purpose of the new Rule 23(b)(3). 37
The focus under the old Rule 23 38, was on the character of the
right sought to be enforced. Whether the right was common and
undivided determined whether the claims of individual plaintiffs in
the class could be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount. 39
The impetus for the promulgation of the new Rule 23 was a desire
to discard this classification according to the nature of the right
asserted, and its ensuing difficulties, and to focus instead on the
practical question of whether a class action is procedurally appro-
priate in a given case. 40
 Zahn, following closely behind Snyder,
returns to a focus on the character of the right asserted, and estab-
lishes that, if the right is a divided one, a class action will not be
permitted.'" The only exception to this prohibition is in those ex-
tremely rare situations wherein each plaintiff will meet the $10,000
jurisdictional amount. Since the typical environmental suit involves
a large number of plaintiffs, the putative class is unlikely to fall
within this exception. To gauge the true impact of Zahn on en-
vironmental litigation, it is necessary to determine whether typical
34
 For a historical development of and a strong argument for the use of ancillary
jurisdiction, see 414 U.S. at 305-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35 Alamares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1085 (2d Cir. 1971). In an action challenging the
sufficiency of hearing procedures with respect to review of local agency action terminating Aid
to Families with Dependent Children, the Second Circuit held that a district court may hear
the ancillary claim of a class consisting of New York State resident-plaintiffs, without
requiring a showing that the claim met the jurisdictional amount, after it had obtained
jurisdiction over a class consisting of New York City resident-plaintiffs. A full treatment of
the issues involved in the use of ancillary jurisdiction to solve jurisdictional problems may be
found in Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 543, 555-59 (1973).
36 414 U.S. at 307-08. Curiously, the majority failed to even address the question of
ancillary jurisdiction. The Court seems to have taken a harder stand in its failure in Zahn to
recognize ancillary jurisdiction over absent plaintiffs than it took earlier in Moore v. County
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). There the Court recognized and seemed to approve of the
trend in the lower courts to use ancillary jurisdiction in such cases, but stressed that the
doctrine is discretionary and that the district court did not exceed its discretion in refusing to
exercise it. Id. at 714-17. This would seem to imply that if the district court in Zahn had
allowed the ancillary claims to be brought into the action, the Court would have allowed it.
37 For a brief discussion of how Snyder's reaffirmance of the old aggregation theory is
inconsistent with the purpose of the new Rule 23, see Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to the Class
Action—A Symposium, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 497 (1969). See also 414 U.S. at 311
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
38 For the full text of the former Rule 23, see note 4 supra.
38 Advisciry Comm. Note, supra note 3, 39 F.R.D. at 98.
so Id .
414 U.S. at 294.
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environmental rights are "common," thus allowing aggregation of
claims in a class action to meet the jurisdictional amount under the
Zahn test, and to consider certain environmental rights that may be
better protected by individual litigation under recent federal statutes
without resorting to a class action suit.
II. FUTURE RULE 23 POSSIBILITIES
In many class actions, especially those in the environmental
area, the precise damages are indeterminate and the absent mem-
bers of the class are often unknown. 42 Zahn's restrictive interpreta-
tion of Rule 23(b)(3) therefore would appear to be a devasting blow
to environmental enforcement. 43 However, a closer examination
reveals that the holding in Zahn is actually quite limited: where
plaintiffs have separate and distinct claims, aggregation will not be
permitted in Rule 23(b)(3) actions, even though some individual
members of the putative class meet the jurisdictional amount. This
is merely an affirmation of a long line of decisions under the so-
called Pinel doctrine: 44
When two or more plaintiffs having separate and distinct
demands unite for convenience and economy in a single
unit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the
requisite jurisdictional amount; but when several plaintiffs
unite to enforce a single title or right, in which they have a
common and undivided interest, it is enough if their in-
terests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount. 45
The disappointing feature of the Zahn decision, then, is not that it
created new barriers to environmental class actions, but that it
failed to discard the old ones existing under the Pinel doctrine, as
the new Rule 23 was clearly intended to do. 46
Thus, after Zahn, the class action device remains available
under Rule 23(b)(3) where the plaintiffs' claims are common and
undivided. One recent federal district court decision has specifically
43 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971). (class
actions by taxicab company on behalf of 550 similar companies in three state area, by
contractor on behalf of 10,000 bulk purchasers, and by city and state on behalf of governmen-
tal units and bulk purchasers in three states, allowed against gasoline companies for alleged
price-fixing in violation of antitrust laws).
43 414 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" The doctrine draws its name from the case of Pinei v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916), even
though the oft-quoted language from Pine! is actually drawn from an earlier case, Troy Bank
v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911). Both cases involved permissive joinder, not a
class action. Perhaps the choice of name is due to Pines holding, on the particular facts
before the Court, that aggregation was inappropriate, 240 U.S. at 596, while Troy Bank held
that it was appropriate, 222 U.S. at 41. For an exhaustive listing of cases following Pinel, see
7 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1756, at 554-55 (1972).
45 222 U.S. at 40.
44
 Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of Jurisdictional
Amount, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 601, 604-06 n.17 (1969).
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recognized that Zahn does not foreclose such claims. In Cass Clay,
Inc. v. Public Service Co.,'" plaintiffs sued to enforce a contract
between a public utility and the government whereby the utility
agreed to pass on to its customers the savings resulting from pur-
chaSing electricity from the government. 48 The court held that the
plaintiffs had a common and undivided interest in the fund gener-
ated by these savings, even though the amount of damages would be
different for each customer, and therefore concluded that Zahn was
not applicable. 49 Thus an aggregation of claims to meet the jurisdic-
tional amount was permitted, and the case was allowed to proceed
as a Rule 23(b)(1) action. 5 °
The Pinel doctrine merely states a rule; it does not provide a
guide for how the rule should be applied. Zahn, by reaffirming the
Pinel doctrine without elaborating any guidelines for its application,
returns to the old Rule 23 thicket where, in the words of the
Advisory Committee, "[i]n practice the terms `joint,' `common,' etc.,
which were used as the basis of the Rule 23 classification proved
obscure and uncertain."5 ' The courts generally have found that the
required common question exists where an alleged antitrust conspir-
acy is the major issue, 52 or where fraudulent misrepresentation on
a massive scale has been alleged." Other than these two general
categories, joint or common rights have been found in a wide range
of fact situations. Those involved in the earlier cases were such as to
fit relatively easily into the common and undivided or separate and
distinct54 categories. 55
47







 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, 39 F.R.D. at 98.
52
 E.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa.
1968); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
53
 E.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969); Weisman v. MCA Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258 (D. ,Del. 1968); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see
Berger v. Purolator Prods., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). For a good discussion on
class actions allowed or denied in antitrust and fraudulent misrepresentation areas, see Note,
Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 539, 549-50 (1969).
54
 See, e.g., Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
55
 The earlier cases were actually actions seeking permissive joinder of parties, and not
class actions; but the aggregation test is the same. See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 397. Where seamen
joined in a suit for wages, since each plaintiff had a separate contract and since the recovery
of each did not affect the rights of others, it was clear that the plaintiffs' interests were
separate and distinct. Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832). See also Rich v.
Lambert, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 347 (1851); Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4 (1834). Where
the plaintiffs claim under a single title or right, so that the adjudication of the claim of any
one plaintiff necessarily involves the validity of the title or right affecting all, it is equally clear
that their interests are common and undivided. Thus, where plaintiffs jointly enter into a
contract with a single defendant, the matter in controversy is the amount of the contract, so
that aggregation will be allowed. The Connemara, 103 U.S. 754 (1880); Shields v. Thomas,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 3 (1854). Where the beneficiaries of an estate sue the administrator for
616
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In the older cases, a frequently used rule to test whether a right
or interest was common, turned on whether it was material to the
defendant how any damages would be distributed among the plain-
tiffs. 56 The reasoning underlying this rule apparently is that if the
defendant is unconcerned with how damages would be distributed,
but is only concerned with whether damages should be given at all,
he is relating to the plaintiffs as a single unit. In such cases the
plaintiffs should be allowed to present their claims accordingly, as a
single unit with a common and undivided interest.
Another similar rule occasionally encountered is that plaintiffs
have a common and undivided interest if the interest of any one
plaintiff is not antagonistic to, but is wholly compatible with, the
interests of those he would represent. 57 This is just another way of
saying that the common goal of the plaintiffs, the right or title they
seek to vindicate, overrides the intereSt each individual plaintiff
may have by way of damages.
Unfortunately, since the late 1800's, no Supreme Court case has
discussed these guidelines or- any others relative to determining
whether a right is common or distinct. In each case on point the
Court has simply cited the Pine! doctrine, which merely holds that
aggregation will be allowed if the right is common, and summarily
placed the right into one of the categories."
Another issue not adequately dealt with by the courts is how
these tests apply to plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. However, it is
converting the estate property to his own use, they all claim under the will controlling the
estate. The validity of the will is the common interest and the matter in controversy will be
the aggregate value of the plaintiffs' claims, normally the value of the estate. Id. See also
Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214 (1899). But where each plaintiff seeks to reform the will to
include himself as an additional beneficiary, their rights are separate and distinct, since the
question of whether one plaintiff should be included has no effect on whether another will be.
Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916). Also, where several mortgagees claim under one
mortgage title it is the amount of the mortgage, which is the aggregate of their claims, that
controls. Rodd v. Heartt, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 354 (1872). See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306
U.S. 583 (1939); Troy Bank v, Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911); New Orleans Pac. Ry.
v. Parker, 143 U.S. 42 (1892); Ex parte Baltimore & 0. R.R., 106 U.S. 5 (1882). However, if
the mortgagees claim under separate mortgages, they no longer have a joint interest. Thus,
each must satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U.S. 631 (1895). But see
Clay v. Field, 138 U.S. 464 (1890). Where plaintiff-relatives jointly sue in a wrongful death
action, their right to compensation is joint, even though the amounts collected by each may be
different. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gentry, 163 U.S. 353 (1896); cf. The "Mamie," 105 U.S. 773
(1881).
51 E.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gentry, i63 U.S. 353, 362'(1896); Handley v. Stutz, 137
U.S. 366, 369 (1890); Gibson v. Schufeldt, 122 U.S. 27, 32 (1887); Davies v. Corbin, 112 U.S.
36, 40 (1884).
57 See, e.g., Advertising Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108, 119 (1st Cir. 1956).
31 See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973); Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S, 66, 74 (1939); Clark v. Paul Gray,
Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 588 (1939); Lion Bonding Co. & Surety v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 85-86
(1923); Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243, 244 (1920); Tide Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Allen, 240
U.S. 136, 140 (1916); Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621, 622 (1916); McDaniel v.
Traylor, 196 U.S. 415, 431 (1905); Wheeless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S, 379, 383 (1901); Clay v.
Field, 138 U.S. 464, 480 (1890).
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difficult to imagine a situation where plaintiffs seeking injunctive
relief would fail to pass the above tests. A defendant has no concern
over how much each individual plaintiff will benefit from a court
order forcing the defendant to act or cease to act in a certain way.
His only concern is whether injunctive relief will be given. Similar-
ly, each plaintiff, even though he may have suffered a different
amount of damage than the others, has an interest in obtaining the
same injunctive relief. Thus his interest is wholly compatible with
and not antagonistic to those of the other plaintiffs.
Upon a superficial analysis, then, it would seem clear that
wherever plaintiffs seek injunctive relief the interest or right in-
volved should be denominated as common, and aggregation should
be allowed. The case law, however, is divided on the issue, with no
clear guidance as to why an interest in receiving injunctive relief is
determined to be common or not. 59 Especially with regard to in-
junctive relief, the confusion is best described by Professor Chaffee:
"Perhaps I am color-blind with respect to class suits, but I often
have as much perplexity in telling a 'common' right from a 'several'
right as in deciding whether some ties and dresses are green or
blue."6° As is true with respect to class actions generally, there
appears to be no case law that develops guidelines to determine
which environmental rights may be denominated common and un-
divided. It appears, however, that many such rights will so qualify,
especially when injunctive relief is sought.
In the typical environmental class action suit, each plaintiff, no
matter how large or small his claim for damages, primarily seeks to
stop the conduct of the defendant. Thus, if each plaintiff were to sue
separately, there would be at least one claim common to the com-
plaints of all: the prayer for injunctive relief to end the defendant's
conduct. So far as reparation for past harm is concerned, the dam-
age claim of one plaintiff may be distinct from the claims of other
plaintiffs, since each may have suffered separate harms of varying
degrees; but his equitable claim, usually his predominant interest, is
not. Seeking injunctive relief in the typical environmental action
would thus establish the common interest of the class members.
This common interest is wholly compatible with, and not in the
least antagonistic to, the interest of all the other plaintiffs. This is
especially true in those class actions where injunctive relief is the
sole remedy sought. In such cases, plaintiffs would seem to meet the
common and undivided interest test almost by definition, and thus
59
 Cases allowing aggregation include Gibbs v. Buck, 307' U.S. 66, 72 (1939); New
Orleans Pac. Ry. v. Parker, 143 U.S. 42, 52 (1892); Davies v. Corbin, 112 U.S. 36, 41 (1884);
The "Mamie," 105 U.S. 773, 774 (1881); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 114 (1879).
Cases in which aggregation was not allowed include Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583,
590 (1939); Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243, 244 (1920); Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Allen, 240
U.S. 136, 140 (1916); Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621, 622 (1916); Wheeless v. St.
Louis, 180 U.S. 379, 383 (1901).
6° Z. Chaffee, Some Problems of Equity 257 (1950).
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be able to form a Rule 23 class. The trend in environmental class
suits today appears to be in the direction of those situations where
injunctive relief is the only appropriate remedy. For this reason,
Zahn may therefore have less impact on future environmental class
actions than on other types of class actions."
Since most environmental class action plaintiffs will seek some
form of injunctive relief and since Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) provide
for such relief, 23(b)(3) is not the only category available. Because
Zahn requires an examination of the nature of the right asserted at
the outset of litigation, regardless of the subcategory of Rule 23(b)
claimed under, plaintiffs will be forced to establish a common
interest in the asserted right before aggregation will be permitted.
Thus, the other subcategories of Rule 23(b) should be examined in
light of Zahn.
A Rule 23(b)(2) class action exists when the requirements of
23(a) have been met and in addition, "the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate, final injunctive relief or corres-
ponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. . )162
If injunctive or declaratory relief is the only remedy sought, the
action is clearly a proper one under the specific language of Rule
23(b)(2). 63
 If monetary damages are also sought, the action risks not
being allowed under 23(b)(2). One authority has suggested that "[i]f
the Rule 23(a) prerequisites have been met and injunctive or de-
claratory relief has been requested, the action usually should be
allowed to proceed under subdivision (b)(2). Those aspects of the
case not falling within Rule 23(b)(2) should be treated as inciden-
tal."64 However, most courts have not treated the mere request for
equitable relief, where damages are also involved, as enough to
qualify an action under 23(b)(2). 65
The prevailing view today is that expressed by the Advisory
Committee: Rule 23(6)(2) actions do "not extend to cases in which
the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominately to
monetary damages. "66
 Not only must the predominate relief sought
be equitable but it must be "final," that is, temporary injunctions or
conditional decrees are excluded. 67 Where the relief sought is pre-
dominately equitable and where there is a choice to proceed under
Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3), the court should allow the .action to go
61
 Thus, it appears that the downfall of the Zahn plaintiffs was that, in seeking
monetary damages only (the amount being different for each individual plaintiff) and failing
to express a common interest by way of a prayer for injunctive relief, their claims fell into the
separate and distinct mire. 414 U.S. at 300.
62 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(bX2).
63
 For the full text of Rule 23, see note 5 supra.
64
 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 1775, at 23 (1972).
65
 See, e.g., Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F,R.D. 7, 15 ( 1 973).
66
 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
67
 See Morse-Starrett Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 205 F.2d 244, 249 (9th Cir. 1953).
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forward under 23(b)(2). 68 In fact, since 23(b)(2) has more stringent
requirements than 23(b)(3) in that final injunctive relief must be
appropriate, virtually every class action qualifying under 23(b)(2)
will also qualify as a 23(b)(3) action. When this is the case, 23(b)(3)
has been held to be inappropriate. 69
Since final injunctive relief would appear to be the primary
relief sought in many environmental actions, 23(b)(2) would seem to
be a most useful category for environmental class suits. However, it
is not yet clear that mere appropriateness of injunctive relief will
fulfill the Zahn requirement of a common and undivided interest
among the members of the class. Thus, there remains the question
of whether aggregation of claims to meet the jurisdictional amount
will be allowed in a 23(b)(2) action. Judge Frankel suggested, soon
after the promulgation of the new Rule 23, that in cases cognizable
under 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), aggregation should be permitted, but not
under 23(b)(3). 7° Although the case law has not yet adopted this
hard and fast view, it is a view consistent with the argument that
plaintiffs seeking predominately equitable relief in an environmental
suit will typically have a common interest that allows aggregation.
Since equitable relief is a remedy available under Rule 23(b)(1),
that section is another avenue open for environmental class suits. A
Rule 23(b)(1) class action exists when the requirements of Rule 23(a)
have been met and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against indi-
vidual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive
of the interests of the other members not party to the
adjudications or substantially impair their ability to protect
their interests; 71
Actions which seek only damages are not appropriate Rule
23(b)(1)(A) actions. The fact that the defendant may have to pay
some plaintiffs and not others is not the inconsistency referred to in
the Rule. 72 Rather, 23(b)(1)(A) actions are appropriate wherever
equitable relief is sought and qualifies as the type likely to force the
defendant to do inconsistent acts. The Advisory Committee gives
66
 See, e.g., Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
69
 See, e.g., Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 730 (M.D. Fla. 1970),
aff'd, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971).
7°
 Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39,
48-53 (1968).
71 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
72
 See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, 39 F.R.D. at 100.
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the example of separate actions by individuals seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief relative to a municipal bond issue. 73 One
plaintiff may seek to declare the issue invalid, another to condition
it, a third to limit it. The issuer of the bond could be called on to
withdraw the offer, to continue the offer at a different interest rate,
or to limit the offer to state residents. Thus the defendant opposing
the class of those attacking the issue would be ordered by different
courts to act in inconsistent ways. 74
In the environmental area for example, suppose municipality X
is burning its refuse in an outmoded incinerator, causing soot to fall
on neighbors A, B and C. A sues to stop all incineration im-
mediately, B to force a scheduled incineration depending on atmos-
pheric conditions, and C to force X to install particulate traps in the
stack. X cannot be ordered to do all three since they are inconsis-
tent. Add to the situation a hundred more plaintiff-neighbors and it
is clear that a class action is the only practical way to settle the
dispute.
The threat of individual suits compelling inconsistent acts is
specious unless there is in fact a possibility that individual suits will
be brought. 75 For example, if the class is small and the individual
claims miniscule, individual suits would be so unlikely as to pre-
clude the use of 23(b)(1)(A). What, then, is the practical difference
between an action brought under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and one brought
under 23(b)(2)? In any situation where final injunctive relief is
appropriate there is always the possibility that a defendant will be
forced into inconsistent actions if the injured parties sue individu-
ally. Thus it would appear that every 23(b)(2) action might also
qualify under the terms of (b)(1). The converse, however, is not
necessarily true. There may be actions seeking declaratory or in-
junctive relief wherein final relief is not requested or appropriate.
These actions would be foreclosed from the 23(b)(2) category, 76 but
might still qualify under 23(b)(1), since even temporary equitable
judgments can place inconsistent demands on a party.
There is little precedent under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) in the environ-
mental area to serve as a guide to future possibilities. Nevertheless,
since environmental abuses are particularly susceptible to attacks
framed in terms of declaratory or injunctive relief, the Rule
23(b)(1)(A) category should not be overlooked by strategists. Its
usefulness, however, will depend in large part on whether aggrega-
tion of claims to meet the jurisdictional amount will be permitted.
But where there are many individuals seeking identical injunctive
relief, a common and undivided interest usually exists, 77 and aggre-




75 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968).
76 See discussion in text at note 66 supra,
77 See discussion in text at notes 58-61 supra.
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The focus in Rule 23(b)(1)(B) actions is not so much on the
effects of inconsistent adjudications, but rather on whether one or
more individual adjudications would effectively prejudice the ability
of other members of a putative class to seek redress. Suppose, for
example, an inventor alleges that a hundred different corporations
have infringed his patent. The issues in a patent infringement case
are often so technically complex that the outcome in a hundred
different suits is not likely to be uniform. If one corporation brought
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid, a
result favorable to the plaintiff could well be dispositive of the
interests of the other ninety-nine companies, and in this way impair
their rights. A Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action on behalf of all one
hundred companies would then be appropriate." Suppose plaintiff
B in the incineration example succeeds in obtaining a court order
forcing X to burn only on days when the wind velocity is at least 10
mph. He has certainly prejudiced the rights of those neighbors
whose homes lie in the dispersal area created by the prevailing 10
mph winds, especially if the court's decree was premised on a
finding that soot deposits are insignificant when discharge occurs
into 10 mph winds.
Whenever injunctive relief is the primary remedy sought under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) it is particularly necessary to allow the action to
proceed as a class action, because injunctive relief obtained by an
individual is more likely to impair the rights of absent plaintiffs than
would a successful individual suit for damages. The extent of dam-
ages that plaintiff A may obtain in an individual suit has little effect
on the damage claim asserted by B in another action. However, the
extent of injunctive relief obtained by A, as in the incineration
example, is more likely to prejudice the rights of B. Although A and
B may have separate interests so far as their respective damage
claims are concerned, since each claim is grounded in past harms
suffered individually, they share a common and undivided interest
with respect to the future in their desire to restrain the polluter.
Furthermore, the damages suffered by one individual may be so
insignificant as to not, as a practical matter, convince a court to
grant injunctive relief. However, the common interest of hundreds
of plaintiffs may well be sufficient to permit such relief. In such
situations a suit by an individual plaintiff may as a practical matter
be dispositive of the rights of the other plaintiffs, and so a class
action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) should be permitted.
Actions which seek only damages are appropriate under Rule
23(b)(1)(B), but presumably they would face the same barrier to
aggregation that the Zahn plaintiffs faced. Again, if injunctive or
declaratory relief is the primary remedy sought, this establishes the
plaintiffs' interests as common and undivided and also makes for a
" See Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. III. 1969)
(patent holder sued over 400 seed companies as a class, alleging patent infringement).
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convincing argument that the rights of absent members will be
impaired should a class action not be allowed. 79
III. STATUTORY RELIEF
There has been significant congressional action relative to en-
vironmental issues since the Zahn case entered litigation. The two
statutes discussed below specifically grant federal jurisdiction with-
out regard to the $10,000 amount, 8 ° allowing individuals with small
claims to sue in federal court, and so may obviate the necessity for
class actions in solving the environmental problems covered therein.
A. Federal Water Pollution Control Act
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 8 ' establish effluent standards for any individual or corporation
dumping effluent into any navigable stream or body of water. It
specifically grants the federal district courts jurisdiction, without
regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties,
over suits instituted by citizens. 82 The statute defines a citizen as
one or more "persons having an interest which is or may be af-
fected."83 The wording of the statute clearly applies few barriers to
environmental suits. The Zahn plaintiffs could not have obtained
jurisdiction under this Act because the pre-1972 version had no
provision for citizen suits." However, in the future, Zahn-type
plaintiffs possessing the applicable substantive claims should be able
to assert federal jurisdiction under this Act and append their claims
for damages. 85
79 But at least one court has refused to allow aggregation in a Rule 23(b)(1)(13) action,
Beckerman v. Sands, 364 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 (S.O.N,Y. 1973).
89 33	 § 1365111,1 (Supp. II 1972). For the text of the relevant portions sec note 8Z
infra; 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970). For the text of the relevant portions see discussion in text
at note 110 infra.
81 33 U.S.C, § 1251 et seq. (Supp. II 1972).
82 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. II 1972) which provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a
civil action an his own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this Act, or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] or a State with respect
to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Adminis-
trator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with
the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in con-
troversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an efiltient standard or
limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or
duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties. [Emphasis
added.]
83 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (Supp. 11 1972).
84 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
88 See discussion in text at notes 96-103 infra.
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Since. there is as yet no reported case law where an injured
party has sued a private individual or corporation under section
1365(a)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, 86 one must look to its legislative history to determine what
limitations, if any, the statute imposed on citizen's suits. The Senate
Public, Works Committee emphasized that citizens should be en-
couraged to bring suit in the district courts against anyone violating
effluent standards and against the EPA administrator for not enforc-
ing those standards. 87 The Committee also encouraged enforcement
actions against government agencies, with specific reference to the
Department of Defense, an agency which has been lax in abating
pollution within its control. 88
 It is clear that Congress, intended few
restraints on citizen suits." It was the intent of Congress however,
not to authorize class action suits under this Act. 9° The only restric-
tion appearing in the statute to this effect is the language stating
that "any citizen may commence a civil action on his-own behalf
. . ."91
 A recent federal district court decision, in refusing to allow a
class action to proceed under the Act, cited the legislative history as
clear evidence that the statute was not intended to authorize class
actions, and concluded that the phrase "on his own behalf" consti-
tutes a specific statutory exclusion of class action suits. 92
Although this interpretation of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 closes the door to class actions
suits, it is still possible under the Act for an individual to achieve
many of the same objectives and benefits that a class action would
obtain. First, a typical water pollution environmental class action
would have as a primary goal the enjoining of further pollution. To
the extent that the challenged pollution exceeds an established
effluent standard, this end will be accomplished just as effectively
66 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. II 1972).
r S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3668, 3677.
as Id. at 3746.
89 "It is the Committee's intent that enforcement of these control provisions be im-
mediate, that citizens should be unconstrained to bring these actions, and that the courts
should not hesitate to consider them." Id.
9° The section is drawn to avoid problems raised by class action provisions of the
Federal civil rules of procedure, specifically by Rule 23. Section 505 does not
authorize a "class action." Instead, it would authorize a private action by any citizen
or citizens acting on their own behalf. Questions with respect to traditional "class"
actions often involve: (1) identifying a group of people whose interests have been
damaged; (2) identifying the amount of total damage to determine jurisdictional
qualification; and (3) allocating any damages recovered. None of these points is
appropriate in citizens suits seeking abatement of violations of water pollution
control requirements. It should be noted, however, that the section would spe-
cifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages
could be shown, other remedies would remain available.
Id.
91 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. II 1972) [emphasis added).
92 Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 264-65 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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by an individual suit prosecuted under the Act. 93 Second, without
the use of the class action approach, an individual plaintiff cannot
share the costs of litigation with others similarly situated, and to this
extent an individual suit under the Act is less advantageous than a
class suit, especially for those plaintiffs with small individual dam-
ages. However, this is mitigated where the plaintiff is successful in
forcing the Administrator to issue an abatement order to the pollu-
ter, as he is entitled to reimbursement of all costs, expenses, and
attorney fees." In addition, if he brings suit and succeeds in obtain-
ing a final court order, the court may award the costs of litigation,
including attorney fees, whenever appropriate. 95 This puts the
plaintiff who brings the suit in virtually as good a position as if he
had brought a class action suit.
A more complicated question arises when a plaintiff is in-
terested not only in putting and end to the pollution, but also in
recovering damages for harm suffered as a result of violation of the
Act. Since there are specific statutory provisions for fines, 96 it might
be argued that these fines are the only monetary liabilities Congress
contemplated imposing on violators prosecuted under the provisions
of the Act. 97 This position, however, does not take into account
Congress's intent that the section authorizing citizen's suits "would
specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law" 98
and how the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would effect claims for
damages under such laws.
The basis of plaintiff's action would then consist of a federal
claim of violation of an effluent standard under the Act and a state
claim for monetary damages due to the pollution. Unlike the plain-
tiffs in Zahn, who tried to use the federal jurisdiction over the
claims of the four named plaintiffs as a basis to extend jurisdiction
over the claims of the absent plaintiffs, a plaintiff under the Act
could, under the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction, use the federal
court's jurisdiction over his federal claim as a basis for extending
federal jurisdiction over his state claim. 99 In Zahn, both the plain-
tiffs and the claims would be different had a class action been
allowed. Under pendent jurisdiction, additional claims rather than
gp 
, Since the Act rests on effluent standards established by the EPA Administrator, if no
standard is yet prescribed for the specific alleged pollutant, no action will obtain under the
Act. Compare cases cited at note Ill infra, decided under the 1970 Clean Air Amendments.
" See 28 U.S.C. •j• 1167(c) (Supp. II 1972). For a discussion of the computation of
awards of attorney's fees see;• Comment, 16 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev, xxx (1975).
95 28 U.S.C. § .1365(d)' (Supp. II 1972). For a discussion of awards of attorney's fees
when not authorized bystatute, see, Liability For Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts—The
Private Attorney General Exception;,16 	 & Corn. L. Rev. 201 (1975).
" See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (SUpp. II 1972).
97 "It should be noted•that any penalties imposed would be deposited as miscellaneous
receipts and not be recovered by the complainant." S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1972 U.S1 Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3745.
91 Id. at 3677.
99 Cf. United Mine : Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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new plaintiffs are admitted. In order to exercise pendent jurisdic-
tion:
The state and federal claims must derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard
to their federal or state character, a plaintiffs claims are
such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in
one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of
the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear
the whole. '°°
Where the state claim is closely tied to questions of federal
policy, it is appropriate, although discretionary, for the federal
courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction over it.'" A plaintiff's dam-
age claims under the Act clearly derive from the common nucleus of
the operative fact of defendant's pollution in excess of an effluent
standard, and such pollution is contrary to the federal policy estab-
lished by the Act. Since his federal claim is substantial and since the
imposition of liability necessary to assess damages will require the
identical findings of fact as the imposition,of liability under the Act,
he would be expected to bring his damage claims into the same
proceeding. In the typical case the facts and issues will be identical
so that plaintiffs damage claim is - merely an additional remedy
sought. Since the subject matter jurisdiction of the court has already
been established by his primary claiin, there is no need to meet the
requisite amount in controversy for the pendent claim. 1 °2
 "And it is
also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done."'"
Once one plaintiff has obtained injunctive relief under the Act,
other plaintiffs who seek monetary damages and who did not join
the original action are certainly not in as good a position as if the
entire controversy were heard in a class action. After one plaintiff
has used the Act to obtain injunctive relief, identical actions by
other plaintiffs for the same injunctive relief would be moot. Thus
these other plaintiffs cannot, use the Act as a vehicle for their
damage claims. They must either seek to institute a class action,
which would be difficult in federal courts since it would be unlikely
they could aggregate their damage claims in an action for only
damages, or they must proceed with individual damage suits under
common law in the state courts. The only consolation is that the
defendant-polluter may be more vulnerable to damage claims of
other, plaintiffs once he has been found guilty, but even this may not
100
 Id.
"" Id. at 727.
1°2 See id. at 725.
'°3
 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
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be true if the state has different substantive law than that defined
by the Act.
B. 1970 Clean Air Amendments
The 1970 Clean Air Amendments 114 were passed with the belief
that deteriorated air quality posed a serious threat to the public
health that could only be successfully overcome by swift and effec-
tive action."' The Act requires the Administrator of the EPA to
establish national air quality standards for various contaminants" 6
and to obtain from and approve plans of the states for meeting these
standards.'" The Administrator may resort to the federal courts to
force compliance from any source in violation of emission stan-
dards.'" Congress wished to encourage enforcement of these stan-
dards by individual citizens as a supplement to federal and state
enforcement. 1 U 9 The Amendments provide that:
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf—(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under
this chapter .. . . The district courts shall have jurisdic-
tion, without regard, to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission stan-
dard or limitation, or such an order . . . 110
There are limitations to possible court actions by citizens: if
there is no final pollution standard set by the EPA, an action under
this Act will not lie.'" Also, if the plaintiff wishes to charge, the
Administrator with abuse of discretion in approving a state plan, he
is restricted to the circuit courts."' Although these restrictions do
not speak to the availability of class actions under the Act, the
words "on his own behalf," identical to the corresponding provision
under the Water Pollution Control Act, 113 would preclude class
action suits.'"
104 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970). For a discussion on the use of the courts to enforce
the provisions of this Act, see Lunenberg & Roselle, Judicial Review Under. the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 667 (1974).
I P See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1970); S. Rep., No. 1196,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1970).
106 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
107 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b) (1970).
' °9 S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1970).
"° 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
1 " Citizens Ass'n v. Washington, 370.F. Supp. 1101 (D.D,C. 1974); Wuillamey v.
Werblin, 364 F. Supp. 237 (D.N.J. 1973).
113 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970). See Ely v. Veld, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971);
Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Del.
1973). Similar actions under the Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 may be
brought in federal district court. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. U 1972).
113 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. I II 1972).
014 Sec text at notes 91-92 supra.
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As far as appending individual damage claims to actions under
the Act, the same arguments discussed relative to the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act are applicable to the Clean Air Amendments. And
since costs can be similarly awarded to successful plaintiffs under
this Act," 5 a plaintiff alleging damages less than $10,000 resulting
from air pollution in excess of federal standards may proceed under
the Act as a reasonable alternative to a class action suit.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Zahn decision was unfortunate, both for its improper
reliance on'Snyder and its failure to adopt ancillary jurisdiction to
bring in parties who do not meet the $10,000 jurisdictional amount.
It is a disappointing decision in that it reverts back to the old Rule
23 aggregation principles based on common and undivided interests.
Although Zahn involved an environmental class action, it is submit-
ted that the holding will have little impact of future environmental
class actions since most environmental class actions seek to enforce
public rights typically involving insignificant individual damages.
The primary relief ordinarily sought is injunctive. Injunctive relief
is a common interest of all the plaintiffs in a putative class in an
environmental suit, and since plaintiffs have this common and un-
divided interest, they will be more likely to be permitted to aggre-
gate their damage claims to meet the jurisdictional amount. Thus
the majority of environmental class actions should be able to avoid
the Zahn jurisdictional problem by requesting solely injunctive re-
lief, or requesting such relief in combination with damages as a
secondary remedy, and presenting the case as a Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2)
or (b)(3) action. In addition, jurisdiction specifically granted to citi-
zens under the Water Pollution Control Act' 16 and the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970,'" although restricted to individual actions,
should avoid the Zahn jurisdictional dispute and will be an accept-
able alternative in most situations covered by those acts.II 8, The net
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 42 U.S.C. § I857h-2(d) (1970).
116
 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. II 1972).
111 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
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 Two additional theories for avoiding the Zahn jurisdictional problem are too specula-
tive to merit lengthy discussion. The first involves the use of one of the acts discussed as a
basis for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)—a federal common law concept.
The argument is that the act creates a federal right and any alleged violation of that right is a
federal question. This approach was taken in Wuillamey v. Werblin, 364 F. Supp. 237
(D.N.J. 1973), and in Citizens Ass'n v. Washington, 370 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1974), but in
light of the limitations on the development of federal common law laid down in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (193A), the theory would seem to have little future.
The second theory is that there is a federal constitutional guarantee to a clean environ-
ment, under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment protection against the deprivation of life
without due process, or under the Ninth Amendment, as a right retained by the people.
Disputes involving the environment would then be federal questions and could claim jurisdic-
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effect of the available alternative is to lessen substantially the im-
pact of the Zahn holding upon future environmental enforcement.
KENNETH G. BOUCHARD
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This approach has been urged by commentators. See e.g.,
Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E = MC 2: Environment Equals Man Times
Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 674 (1970); Klipsch, Aspects of a
Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environment, 49 Incl. L.J. 49 (1974); Note, Toward a
Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 Va. L. Rev. 458 (1970). However, its reception in
the courts has been cool. See, e.g., Ely v. Veld, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). But see
Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972) (Fifth Amendment "protects
health"); Environmental Defense Fund v. Waldorf, I E.R.C. 1640 (D. Mont. 1970) (individ-
uals protected in their "natural state of life and health").
These two approaches could avoid the Zahn amount-in-controversy problem only by
claiming that the right to clean air, water or environment is worth at least $10,000 to each
plaintiff. Although reasonable arguments can be made for such a valuation, the cool reception
accorded both of these theories by the courts indicates that their usefulness is merely
academic, at least for the present.
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